Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi is set to meet his European counterparts in Geneva Friday (November 29) to discuss a possible revival of the 2015 nuclear deal. The meeting follows the collapse of an earlier proposal in which Iran had offered to limit its uranium enrichment to 60 percent purity – just below the level needed to make a nuclear weapon. Iranian officials described the proposal as an initial step toward restoring trust with Western countries.
The talks will mark the end of a two-year hiatus in detailed negotiations on the expired Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement. While representatives of the EU, France, Germany and the UK are scheduled to attend the meeting, China, Russia and the United States will not be present.
Despite Tehran’s assurances that its nuclear program is peaceful, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has expressed significant concerns. Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi has cautioned that Iran has enough weapons-grade uranium to make “several” nuclear bombs if it were to proceed further.
The situation first began to deteriorate in 2018 when donald trump decided to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement and reinstate harsh economic sanctions, which seriously affected Iran’s economy. In response, Tehran began gradually reducing its compliance with the deal.
Earlier this year, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that Iran’s “breakout time”, or the period needed to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, had dropped to “perhaps a week or two”, which This is the shortest time frame publicly accepted so far. American officials.
Iran’s exploration of nuclear technology began in the early 1970s, inspired by the Shah of Iran’s vision for oil wealth and industrial and technological advancement.
According to a report by Sina Azodi published in 2021 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an American think tank, The Shah’s government ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 and began limited nuclear activities. However, their ambitions were largely derailed by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which forced the program to become inactive.
The Iranian revolutionary government considered nuclear technology expensive and highly dependent on Western support. Following the revolution, the first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Fereydoun Sahabi, stated that, “In addition to technical difficulties, we are facing increasing costs, which were not predicted when these agreements were first signed. Was signed.”
Iran’s nuclear ambitions changed dramatically once again around the halfway point of the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s. As Azoudy argues, the program had to be reconsidered because of the existential threats posed by Iraq’s chemical weapons and conventional military superiority. Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, who served as the fourth President of Iran, later commented, “When we first started, we were at war, and we looked for the possibility for the day that the enemy would have nuclear weapons.” That was the idea, but it never became real.”
Iran significantly expanded its nuclear capabilities in the 1990s. A report by the foreign policy think tank Stimson Center shows that Iran reached an agreement with China in 1990 to secure nuclear cooperation and an agreement with Russia in 1995 to complete the Bushehr reactor, the Middle East’s first nuclear power plant. Signed the agreement. Like the Shah, the Islamic Republic also sent Iranian engineers abroad for advanced training in nuclear technology to ensure the continuity of the program.
according to Iran WatchA portal to track developments in the area Created by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in the late 1990s, senior Iranian officials approved a plan called the Amad Plan to build an arsenal of five nuclear weapons by 2004.
In 2002, the National Resistance Council of Iran revealed the existence of two nuclear facilities: a uranium enrichment site at Natanz and a heavy water production facility at Arak. Iran Watch emphasizes that while these facilities had potential civilian uses, they also had military applications. Natanz can produce weapons-grade uranium, and Arak can produce plutonium. Their concealment from the IAEA increased suspicions about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
amad scheme
Several important events in the early 2000s reshaped Iran’s nuclear trajectory. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq removed a major regional threat to Iran. According to Azodi, revelations about Iran’s secret underground enrichment facility in Natanz led to increased international scrutiny.
The George W. Bush administration’s adoption of the ‘Freedom Agenda’ and its ‘pre-emptive war’ doctrine, coupled with threats of direct regime change, increased significant pressure. This environment likely led Iran to reevaluate its nuclear strategy, as Tehran feared that the program could serve as a pretext for a US invasion. In 2003, Iran formally halted the Amad Plan.
However, as Iran Watch notes, the end of the Amad plan does not mean the end of all weapons-related activities. Instead, Iran divided its nuclear efforts into overt and covert streams. The overt program included facilities such as the Natanz and Arak heavy-water plants, while covert research continued on sensitive technologies, including computer modeling for detonation and yield calculations.
In 2003, Iran also suspended enrichment activities and signed an additional protocol with the IAEA under an agreement brokered by the EU-3 (France, Germany and the UK). Despite these commitments, Iran’s disclosures to the IAEA in 2004 and 2005 were incomplete, raising concerns over the transparency of the program. By 2006, Iran announced that it had enriched uranium to 3.6 percent, further escalating tensions. These developments prompted the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, Britain and the US and Germany) to propose a framework to curb Iran’s enrichment, but the diplomatic standoff deepened, resulting in UN sanctions and International isolation increased.
Obama and Iran deal
Barack ObamaHis presidency marked a shift toward multilateral engagement on Iran’s nuclear program. Talks resumed in 2009, initially focusing on a fuel swap arrangement, which Iran ultimately rejected. As Sanam Vakil reported in 2020 Chatham HouseAttempts by Türkiye and Brazil to make a similar deal in 2010 also failed. That same year, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1929, imposing tough sanctions on Iran’s energy and financial sectors. Throughout this period, Tehran insisted on its right to enrich uranium, a sticking point that hindered progress in the negotiations.
In 2012, a backchannel was established between the US and Iran, complementing the broader P5+1 discussions. The Obama administration proposed a framework for limited domestic enrichment in exchange for long-term sanctions and stronger monitoring mechanisms over Iran’s nuclear program. This change in US policy, coupled with the election of moderate President Hassan Rouhani in 2013, revived talks. By 2015, these efforts culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council.
The goal of the JCPOA was to extend Iran’s breakout time through stringent monitoring provisions, including unprecedented IAEA access. Iran destroyed two-thirds of its centrifuges, shipped out 97 percent of its enriched uranium stockpile, and agreed to redesign the Arak reactor to halt plutonium production. Implementation Day, January 16, 2016, marked the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions following Iran’s compliance with the terms of the agreement.
Despite its achievements, the JCPOA faced criticism. Regional players such as Israel and Saudi Arabia argued that the deal failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program and support for proxy groups. Meanwhile, conservatives in Iran feared that the deal would compromise national sovereignty. Trump described the JCPOA as “the worst deal ever” that could lead to “nuclear annihilation”.
Nevertheless, the JCPOA received cautious approval from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iran’s parliament.
back and forth
Under the Trump administration, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018. This decision received widespread international criticism. In a joint statement, the leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom reaffirmed their commitment to the JCPOA, saying that the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the agreement creates a “binding international legal framework for resolution of the dispute”. It has happened.
according to Center for Arms Control and Non-ProliferationThe Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy included reimposing severe sanctions on Iran and threatening financial isolation for allies that failed to comply. These actions angered key allies and ruined opportunities for renegotiation to address concerns about the original deal.
From 2018 to 2020, Iran restarted enrichment activities, restarted research on advanced centrifuges and expanded its stockpile of nuclear material, halving its breakout time. By the end of Trump’s term, Iran’s nuclear program had advanced significantly, and the country had adapted to the sanctions by stabilizing its economy, even at a heavy cost to its citizens. Iran also increased its retaliatory measures against US interests in the region, complicating US regime-change aspirations.
Joe BidenThe election promised possible redistricting. Biden’s administration expressed willingness to re-engage with Iran on nuclear issue Diplomacy If Tehran complies with the JCPOA protocol. However, as academic Jane Darby Menton notes foreign policyConfidence in US commitments was severely undermined by Trump’s withdrawal. The election of Iran’s hardline president, the late Ebrahim Raisi, in 2021 further complicated negotiations, as the new administration took a more skeptical approach to diplomacy with the West. Meanwhile, consensus among the original signatories of the JCPOA collapsed, and Iran strengthened its alliance with the autocratic regime. Russia,
What will happen next?
The path forward to address Iran’s nuclear program is fraught with uncertainty. According to Menton, “Over the past five years, the prospects for peacefully resolving the Iran nuclear crisis have gone from bad to worse. Tehran is once again on the verge of a breakout, and addressing proliferation concerns through diplomacy has become increasingly difficult.
She attributes this decline not only to technical constraints but also to changing political dynamics.
confrontation Tension has increased between the two countries in Gaza israel and Iran, culminating in an Israeli airstrike on an Iranian nuclear facility at Parchin in October 2024. While Biden has expressed his opposition to such pre-emptive attacks on nuclear facilities, the dynamics are expected to change with the return of President-elect Trump. During his campaign, Trump urged Israel to “strike nuclear first and worry about the rest later”, indicating a more aggressive stance toward Iran under his incoming administration.
However, experts suggest this approach may face significant obstacles. As several analysts at the Brookings Institution pointed out in a 2024 report, the effectiveness of Trump’s previous sanctions strategy depended heavily on international compliance, particularly from China – support that has since waned.
Moreover, key regional players such as Saudi Arabia have changed strategies, preferring dialogue with Tehran rather than confrontation. These changing geopolitical alignments could blunt the impact of new US efforts to isolate Iran economically and diplomatically.
Amid these growing crises, Iran is becoming less likely to use restrictions on its nuclear program as a bargaining tool. As the landscape becomes more volatile, the prospects for a diplomatic solution are slimmer than ever.